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INTRODUCTION 
When  visual  cognition  is  studied  from  an  interdisci-
plinary  perspective,  researchers  typically  try  to  un-
derstand  how  the  specific  data-processing  modules 
in the cortex mediate perception of and attention to 
features, objects, and events. It was only in the eight-
ies when researchers of cognitive processes began to 
pay attention also to the contribution of the so-called 
non-specific systems of modulation to the perceptual 
and  attentional  processes  (Baars,  1988;  Bachmann, 
1984; Crick, 1984). As one particular instance of such 
an approach, the theory of masking named percep-
tual retouch theory was introduced (Bachmann, 1984, 
1994, 1999).
In  this  theory,  masking  and  some  other  related 
phenomena  (flash-lag  effect,  line  motion  illusion,  at-
tentional  facilitation  by  local  pre-cueing,  perceptual 
latency  priming)  were  interpreted  as  a  consequence 
of certain perturbations or unusual associations of the 
ABsTRACT
In the perceptual retouch theory, masking and 
related microgenetic phenomena were explained 
as a result of interaction between specific corti-
cal  representational  systems  and  the  non-spe-
cific  sub-cortical  modulation  system.  Masking 
appears as deprivation of sufficient modulation 
of the consciousness mechanism suffered by the 
target-specific signals because of the temporal 
delay of non-specific modulation (necessary for 
conscious representation), which explicates the 
later-coming  mask  information  instead  of  the 
already  decayed  target  information.  The  core 
of the model envisaged relative magnitudes of   
EPsPs of single cortical cells driven by target and 
mask signals at the moment when the nonspe-
cific, presynaptic, excitatory input arrives from 
the thalamus. In the light of the current evidence 
about  the  importance  of  synchronised  activity 
of specific and non-specific systems in generat-
ing consciousness, the retouch theory requires 
perhaps  a  different  view.  This  article  presents 
some  premises  for  modification  of  the  retouch 
theory, where instead of the cumulative presy-
naptic spike activities and EPsPs of single cells, 
the oscillatory activity in the gamma range of the 
participating systems is considered and shown 
to be consistent with the basic ideas of the re-
touch theory. In this conceptualisation, O-bind-
ing refers to specific encoding which is based on 
gamma-band  synchronised  oscillations  in  the 
activity of specific cortical sensory modules that 
represent features and objects; C-binding refers 
to the gamma-band oscillations in the activity of 
the non-specific thalamic systems, which is nec-
essary for the O-binding based data to become 
consciously experienced.
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interactive effects of processing sub-systems within a 
larger set of brain systems, which are considered the 
very  mechanism  of  conscious  experience.  Basically, 
masking was explained as the result of relative depriva-
tion for specific data processing (that of the target) of 
the service by the processes that typically perform the 
function of generating conscious experience for actual 
sensory information. In normal perception which is ac-
companied by conscious experience of the perceptual 
object,  specific  data  (features)  about  that  object,  as 
represented  by  the  driver-neurons’  cortical  activity, 
has to be modulated by presynaptic facilitatory input 
from the non-specific sub-cortical systems. Without this 
kind of non-specific modulation, the data represented 
in the specific cortical modules remains pre-conscious 
(Bachmann, 1984, 1994; Bogen, 1995; Crick & Koch, 
2003; Llinás, 2001; Magoun, 1958; Rees, Kreiman, & 
Koch, 2002; Schiff & Purpura, 2002). The operation of 
causing pre-conscious specific perceptual information to 
become explicit in conscious representation was termed 
perceptual retouch by Bachmann (1984, 1994).
The spatio-temporal properties of the functioning of 
the specific representational systems and non-specific 
modulation systems enabled to be put forward a mask-
ing theory which was surprisingly well consistent with 
quite many empirical facts from masking experiments 
(Bachmann,  1984,  1994).  The  most  important  of 
these properties are as follows: 1. Sensory stimulation 
evokes both specific data coding in the cortical sen-
sory areas (SP) and a non-specific arousal-like process 
in the sub-cortical (especially reticular and thalamic) 
centers (NSP). The delay with which evoked activity 
reaches  cortical  parts  of  SP  is  substantially  shorter 
(e.g., a few dozen ms) than the delay with which the 
NSP  activity  or  a  dynamic  change  in  NSP  activity, 
evoked through collaterals, arrives at the designated 
driver neurons in the same cortical SP locations. The 
boost of NSP-impulses that is necessary for creating 
an explicit representation of sufficient saliency arrives 
at the cortex when the SP-processes are already more 
or less stabilised and their activity is about to decay.
2. While receptive fields of SP neurons are small 
and allow detailed representation, with specific con-
tents varying from driver to driver (detector to detec-
tor),  receptive  fields  of  NSP  neurons  are  large  and 
unspecific regarding detailed contents (Brooks & Jung, 
1973; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Crick & Koch, 
2003; Purpura, 1970). This property enables stimuli 
that  are  separated  in  space  and  represent  different 
specific contents to evoke activity and interact through 
the  activity  of  the  same  NSP  unit.  For  instance,  an 
initially presented stimulus (S1) evokes NSP-activity 
that can presynaptically modulate both the SP-units 
representative of S1 itself and SP-units representative 
of S2. These interacting stimuli need not be spatially 
superimposed,  although  they  may  be.  (Figure  1  il-
lustrates the functional architecture of the dual-proc-
ess  approach  that  lays  the  grounds  for  the  retouch 
theory.)
Backward  masking  (including  metacontrast)  was 
explained in the following way. S1 leads to (1) fast 
coding within cortical SP and (2) a slower NSP-proc-
ess. When S2 is presented very soon after S1 (e.g., 
with stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA, equal to 15 ms), 
a more or less simultaneous process of feature-coding 
and object formation is going on in SP for S1- and 
S2 features, and a common (“blended”) pre-conscious 
representation  of  a  pseudo-object  is  formed.  When 
the delayed modulation from NSP arrives presynapti-
cally onto S1 and S2 related SP-units in the cortex, 
the result of retouch for consciousness will be that a 
blended pseudo-object is perceived. Whether both S1 
and S2 can be distinctly perceived depends (a) on the 
intensity relations between S1 and S2 (a more intense 
stimulus’ features and surfaces dominating), and (b) 
Figure 1. 
A schematic of the functional architecture of the two interact-
ing systems for sensory data processing. Specific pathways 
(SP) send sensory signals upstream to the specific cortical 
modules that encode stimuli features and integrate objects 
in terms of their specific contents. This fast system builds 
perceptual  representations  also  pre-consciously.  A  slower, 
non-specific system (NSP), which is located in feature-wise 
non-specialised thalamic and reticular centers (e.g., intrala-
minar nuclei, reticular nucleus, globus pallidum), interacts 
with  cortical  specific  units  by  modulating  cortical  activity, 
preferrably in a facilitative way, increasing the frequency of 
firing of the specific units, decreasing their firing latency and 
modulating the timing of discharge patterns. The SP-system 
serves for binding objects from features (O-binding), the NSP 
system serves for modulating the activities of the O-binding 
system up to the level which is sufficient for explicit percep-
tion (consciousness) of the perceptual representations car-
ried by the specific representational units. O-binding system 
work is necessary for the contents of conscious perception, 
but insufficient without the additional upgrading by the C-
binding system. Both systems together are sufficient for per-
ceptual consciousness.
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on the spatial relations between S1 and S2 character-
istics. Say, in metacontrast, where stimuli do not over-
lap spatially, both can be well perceived. In pattern 
masking with overlapping features, the perceptibility 
of  S1  and  S2  depends  on  the  mutual  camouflaging 
capabilities of the stimuli. Therefore, with the shortest 
SOAs between S1 and S2, S1 can be perceived well 
or not so well, depending on the peculiarities of inter-
stimulus interaction within SP.
When S2 is presented after S1 with an intermediate 
delay  (e.g.,  SOA  =  50-80  ms),  the  NSP-modulation 
boost evoked by S1 arrives at the cortical SP at the 
moment when the S2 specific process is at its maxi-
mum (e.g., EPSP level is maximised), but the S1 spe-
cific process has begun to decay (e.g., EPSP level has 
somewhat subsided already). As a result, in the re-
touched perceptual image, S2 saliency is higher than 
S1 saliency and S2 dominates S1, as is the case in mu-
tual masking (e.g., Bachmann & Allik, 1976; Michaels 
&  Turvey,  1979)  or  in  metacontrast  (Breitmeyer, 
1984). Subjects attend to S2 and it will replace S1 in 
subjective perceptual representation. With long SOAs 
above 150-200 ms, subjects perceive distinct succes-
sive objects – S1 and S2; both objects have had their 
own retouch cycles and they are entered into and held 
in short-term memory.
In this conceptualisation, the activity of single units 
was postulated to represent the activity of the whole 
pool of responsible neurons. Perceptual retouch theory, 
besides what was described above, was also able to 
predict  perceptual  latency  priming  (PLP,  Bachmann, 
1989;  Neumann  &  Scharlau,  in  press;  Scharlau,  in 
press), backward masking with common-onset, asyn-
chronous  offset  displays ( Cohene  &  Bechtoldt,  1974; 
Di Lollo et al., 2000), a variety of psychophysiological 
effects where experimental facilitation of the NSP leads 
to unusually efficient perception of S1 (e.g., Bachmann, 
1994),  and  some  more  effects.  Despite  this,  several 
controversial aspects of the retouch theory became evi-
dent. While Breitmeyer and Öğmen (2000) suggested 
testing a unique retouch-theory prediction that there 
could be an illusory temporal order reversal between 
S1 and S2, the properties of this illusion (Bachmann et 
al., 2004) did not fit with retouch explanation. With PLP, 
the time properties of the maximum priming effect pre-
dicted by the retouch theory (at about 50-100 ms) did 
not conform easily to several instances of much higher 
PLP values found in recent experiments (e.g., Scharlau, 
in press; Scharlau et al., 2005).
In the retouch theory, the effects of increased vis-
ibility and saliency that ensue due to NSP-modulation 
were not differentially related to the contour system 
and surface representation system responses. However, 
manifold evidence shows that time-course functions of 
masking can substantially differ for those two percep-
tual properties of objects in masking (Breitmeyer et 
al., 2006; Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Ishikawa et al., 
2006). Moreover, retouch theory is undeveloped to ac-
count for the intriguing differences between backward 
(metacontrast) masking, where the same local vernier 
targets and masks allow either strong masking or un-
masking depending on whether the so-called shine-
through test-and-mask combinations are used or not 
(e.g., Herzog, 2006). All this enforces thinking about 
the revision or additional development of the retouch 
theory.
But this is not all. In the retouch theory, the core 
mechanism was the mechanism for generating con-
sciousness as it was understood until 1984. Since then, 
important developments have also changed the under-
standing of the mechanisms of conscious experience. 
Although the basic principle – SP has to be modulated 
by NSP in order to be able to explicitly communicate 
SP  contents  –  has  remained  the  same,  many  new 
characteristics of how SP and NSP interact so as to 
produce consciousness have become clearer (Bogen, 
1995; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Engel & Singer, 2001; 
Llinás & Ribary, 2001; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002; 
Sherman  &  Guillery,  1998;  Singer,  1998;  Steriade, 
1996a, b; Steriade, Jones, & Llinás, 1990; Steriade, 
Jones,  &  McCormick,  1997;  Ward,  2003).  This  also 
necessitates some revision of the perceptual retouch 
theory. The remaining part of the present article is de-
voted to outlining the premises for such a revision (or 
rather – development).
PERCEPTUAL BINDING THROUGH 
sYNCHRONIsED OsCILLATIONs 
In the retouch theory there are two systems: (1) SP 
for stimulation content representation and (2) NSP for 
upgrading the selected contents of SP into consciously 
experienced, explicit representation. Let us first see 
what the SP does when fulfilling its representational 
function according to our current knowledge.
According to a widely accepted standpoint, per-
ceptual  representations  are  formed  by  the  mutual 
binding of features to coherent objects (Cleeremans, 
2003; Crick & Koch, 2003; Engel & Singer, 2001; 
Treisman, 1998; von der Malsburg, 1995). But the 
problem is that the same feature-codes can be part 
of different sets of conjugated objects. A quite likely 
mechanism does exist that may be flexible enough 
to use a limited number of features (such as “let-44
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ters”) for putting together a virtually endless number 
of objects from combined features (such as “words 
and sentences”), and all the time changing the inte-
grated sets: the neurons that represent various fea-
tures, the activity of which increases and decreases 
in synchrony (the oscillating pattern of synchronized 
activity),  could  be  the  very  mechanism  of  feature 
binding (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Edelman & 
Tononi, 2000; Engel & Singer, 2001; Koch, 2004). 
Let me term the binding of features into objects as 
O-binding. (See also Figure 1.)
The best candidate for carrying out feature-binding 
operations through neuronal synchrony turns out to 
be the synchronized gamma-band activity (>40 Hz) 
of cortical specialized driver neurons that are tuned to 
specific features and characteristics of environmental 
stimuli ( Busch  et  al.,  2006;  Doesburg  et  al.,  2005; 
Engel et al., 2001; Fries et al., 2001; Melcher et al., 
2005; Melcher & Vidnyanszky, 2006; Tallon-Baudry et 
al., 2005; Womelsdorf et al., 2006). Importantly, gam-
ma-range synchrony seems to be also able to assist 
pre-conscious binding in the conditions where target 
stimuli remain out of awareness. Thus, the SP-function 
in the retouch theory can be implemented by the syn-
chronized gamma-activity of the specific cortical neu-
rons in the sensory areas of the brain. Although the first 
impulses in the sensory cortex after specific stimulation 
can appear already within 10-30 ms, the setting of ex-
tended synchrony takes about 50-120 ms (Busch et al., 
2006; Herrmann & Mecklinger, 2001; Tallon-Baudry et 
al.,  2005).  Top-down,  reentrant  signaling  within  the 
cortical SP-domain appears to participate in singling 
out the selected set of features for object representa-
tion (Engel et al., 2001; Fries et al., 2001; Lamme, 
2003).  Thus,  feature-  and  object-level  representat- 
ions capable of exerting pre-conscious effects can be 
built  up  by  fast  automatic  gamma-synchronisation 
between specific neurons in SP. Quite probably, these 
processes also participate in pre-conscious priming ef-
fects (e.g., Breitmeyer et al., 2005; Elliott & Müller, 
1998). Evidence points to the regularity that pre-con-
scious  representations  presume  more  localized  syn-
chrony,  while  consciousness-related  representations 
are associated with more global neuronal synchrony 
(Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Haynes et al., 2005; Ward, 
2003).
ATTENTION ENHANCES GAMMA-
REsPONsEs
Although  gamma-synchronicity  is  a  response  given 
also to unattended stimuli, attention and awareness-
related  status  tend  to  enhance  gamma-oscillations. 
Thus, Summerfield et al. (2002) showed that aware-
ness  of  backward-masked  stimuli  correlated  with 
gamma-activity  in  occipital  and  temporal  cortices. 
High-contrast,  small,  periodic  stimuli  elicit  gain  and 
synchrony of gamma responses in visual areas when 
the  stimuli  are  attended  (Womelsdorf  et  al.,  2006). 
Yet, unattended stimuli also evoke a burst of gamma 
activity, although the spike-field coherence is smaller 
than in attended conditions. The onset-related firing 
rate was maximal at about 150 ms, post-stimulus. In a 
shape-tracking task, successful allocation of attention 
enhanced gamma-response (Taylor et al., 2005). But 
unattended changes in visual shapes also were accom-
panied by gamma boosts. Thus attention necessarily 
boosts gamma responses, but cannot be regarded as 
a sufficient mechanism for consciousness. In binocu-
lar rivalry, transient bursts of increased global phase 
synchrony in the gamma band were associated with 
visibility (Doesburg et al., 2005). As in rivaly no strong 
input transients are involved and because the gam-
ma-band activity begun to peak 400-250 ms before 
subjects responded to the change, all this may point 
to the possibility that we deal here with endogeneous 
gamma-enhancement (an equivalent of retouch activ-
ity?) that predicts recruitment of SP-representations 
for consciousness. One way or another, gamma-syn-
chrony appears to be associated with coherent con-
scious  percepts.  But  again,  it  seems  necessary,  but 
we do not know on what conditions it also becomes 
sufficient.
It is known that lateral occipital and temporal ar-
eas  display  gamma  oscillations  to  attended  stimuli 
(Tallon-Baudry et al., 2005). The latency of the re-
sponse  equals  about  100  ms.  Gamma-oscillations 
in  the  calcarine  gyrus  are  characterised  by  a  fast-
emerging,  high-frequency  pattern  (even  more  than 
70 Hz). In a visual discrimination task that involves 
feature  binding,  gamma-response  to  an  attended 
object emerges within only 50-150 ms (Herrmann & 
Mecklinger, 2001).
In  the  author’s  present  thinking,  both  attention 
and the consciousness-related property of perception 
are strongly associated with gamma-frequency brain 
activities, but the double dissociation for (1) attention-
related gamma activity and (2) consciousness-related 
gamma activity is yet to be demonstrated in numer-
ous replication studies. The arguments why I prefer 
not to put an equation mark between attention and 
consciousness can be found in Bachmann (2006). Most 
importantly, fully focused and intense attending to a 
stimulus or location (e.g., in metacontrast masking, Synchronised oscillations and retouch
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binocular  rivalry  or  motion-induced  blindness)  that 
also brings about a gamma burst in the brain does 
not automatically guarantee consciousness for the at-
tended to or expected stimulus. And vice versa: for 
information processing that is biased and facilitated by 
selective attention, and that should produce gamma 
enhancement, there is no guarantee that the corre-
sponding  stimulus-information  becomes  consciously 
apprehended (e.g., Jaśkowski et al., 2002; Kentridge 
et  al.,  2004).  Indirectly,  this  supports  the  idea  that 
we need to have not only one variety or mechanism 
of gamma-activity as related to attention/conscious-
ness,  but  it  may  be  better  to  look  for  at  least  two 
brain systems prone to gamma-range dynamics when 
selectively  processing  information,  but  at  the  same 
time possessing relative functional autonomy. This is 
what fits with the agenda of the following part of this 
article.
CONsCIOUsNEss APPEARs TO  
OPERATE THROUGH sYNCHRONIsED 
NsP-ACTIVITY
It is well known that even unconscious brains can 
respond to specific sensory input in a selective and 
feature-wise adequate ways (de Gelder, de Haan, & 
Heywood, 2001; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dixon, 
1981; He, Cavanagh, & Intriligator, 1996; Jaśkowski 
et  al.,  2002;  Kinoshita  &  Lupker,  2003;  Marcel, 
1983;  Morris,  Öhman,  &  Dolan,  1998;  Moutoussis 
& Zeki, 2002;  VanRullen & Koch, 2003),  including 
persistent  vegetative  state  patients  (Kotchoubey, 
2005). On the other hand, relatively small injuries or 
narrowly localised anaesthetic targeting can render 
subjects  totally  unconscious  (Baars,  1997;  Bogen, 
1995; Newman, 1995; Steriade & McCarley, 2005). 
The defining picture of brain activity which accom-
panies conscious experience of stimuli consists in a 
widespread cortical oscillatory activity in the specific 
modular systems (O-binding of the data content rep-
resentation), which is being modulated by subcorti-
cal (thalamic and reticular) oscillatory activity gener-
ated in the so-called non-specific system (Edelman & 
Tononi, 2000; Llinás et al., 1998; Munk et al., 1996;   
Singer, 1998; Steriade & McCarley, 2005). The latter 
can be termed binding for consciousness or C-bind-
ing. (See also Figure 1.) This general understand-
ing  has  been  predated  by  earlier  seminal  works 
by Bremer (1935), Bogen (1995), Hassler (1978), 
Jung (1958), Magoun (1958), Moruzzi and Magoun 
(1949), Purpura (1970), Steriade (1997, 2000) and 
several others.
One of the best models so far to describe SP/NSP 
oscillatory interaction in generating conscious repre-
sentation has been offered by Rodolfo Llinás (e.g., 
Llinás, 2001; Llinás et al., 2002, 2005). A neuronal 
loop, including specific sensory units, contains pro-
jections onto cortical pyramidal neurons and inhibi-
tory interneurons, and also collaterals to the NSP. A 
different loop includes NSP neurons located in the 
thalamus,  which  project  to  deeper  and  superficial 
layers of the cortex and give collaterals to the reticu-
lar nucleus and striatum and putamen. Collaterals of 
these two looping local circuits produce also feedback 
inhibition via the reticular nucleus and globus pal-
lidus. The return pathway returns oscillations back 
to  the  reticular,  specific  thalamic  and  non-specific 
thalamic nuclei. When excited to respond to sensory 
input, both circuits produce gamma-frequency oscil-
lations, but conscious awareness requires that these 
oscillations become synchronised. (See Figure 2 for 
an  illustration  of  the  elementary  cortical  module 
that  exemplifies  such  an  interaction.)  Supralinear 
summation  of  SP-  and  NSP-inputs  at  the  cortical 
effect  layer  demonstrates  coincidence  detection 
along the apical dendrites, the very mechanism of 
synchronised oscillatory activity. Llinás explains that 
coincidence  detection  by  coactivation  of  SP-  and 
NSP units provides the basis for temporal conjunc-
tion that supports cognitive binding in the conscious 
brain (for the details of summation and modulation 
see Llinás et al., 2002, 2005; coincidence detection 
mechanisms are well explained in detail, for instance 
by Börgers et al., 2005, Matell & Meck, 2004, Wang 
& Slotine, 2005).
Thus, oscillations that make the core of O-binding 
have to be associated with oscillations that make the 
core of C-binding, and their joined and coordinated 
activity is the necessary condition for a consciously 
experienced perceptual representation. Because the 
within-SP,  oscillatory  effect  is  an  extended  process 
in time (not an instantaneous “thing”), epitomising   
O-binding,  and  because  the  within-NSP,  oscillatory 
effect  is  also  a  process  –  C-binding  for  conscious-
ness – we may indeed descibe the whole activity as 
“binding binding”. As long as an object is present to 
the  senses  and  capable  of  stimulating  cortical  SP-
neurons, O-binding represents it continually in time, 
but  not  necessarily  in  a  conscious  format  unless  it 
is supplemented by C-binding operations. As long as 
SP-stimulation  is  capable  of  recruiting  additionally 
the NSP-loops’ oscillations, C-binding, by binding O-
binding with itself, represents that object in conscious 
experience.46
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VISUAL BACKWARD MASKING AND 
RELATED PHENOMENA IN THE 
LIGHT OF “BINDING BINDING”
Let me explain backward masking by the interaction of 
O-binding and C-binding. After having been presented, 
S1 evokes and sets the SP- and NSP oscillatory activity 
in motion. The part of modulating oscillatory activity 
which is caused by S1 transient becomes effective at 
the cortical level later than the cortical burst of SP-
system  gamma-oscillations  for  S1  had  emerged.  At 
the same later time, the gamma-burst of S2-evoked 
oscillatory activity is generated. C-binding has to deal 
with two competing oscillatory neuronal active ensem-
bles – that for S1 (already decaying) and that for S2 
(showing the most-vigorous, “fresh” pattern of oscilla-
tions with higher amplitude and perhaps with slightly 
better coherence characteristics). Moreover, reentrant 
signals within the cortical SP meet more driving input 
from S2 than from S1, which has been switched off 
already earlier. As a result, S2 features as bound by 
S2-related O-binding in SP become the prime contents 
to be bound for conscious experience by C-binding. S2-
related synchronisations control what predominantly is 
the SP-counterpart of the joined SP + NSP oscillatory 
system. It may be important that phase coherence can 
be more easily driven by oscillations that have a higher 
amplitude, i.e., by the S2-related oscillatory activity.
Because the burst of oscillatory activity tends to di-
minish in amplitude and/or gamma-coherence (Busch 
et al., 2006; Steriade & McCarley, 2005; Tallon-Baudry 
et al., 2005), S2-related SP-oscillations always have 
an  advantage  over  S1-related  SP-oscillations  when 
NSP-based modulatory oscillations become applied a 
bit  later  in  time.  Because  the  “focused  arousal”  re-
sponse  (Sheer,  1984;  Singer  &  Gray,  1995)  is  very 
clearly expressed, but “lazy” in time, the stimuli that 
follow other stimuli in time are dominating in explicit 
perception in the experiments where fast-alternating 
presentation conditions are used.
Why is it that in metacontrast the first-coming target 
is often totally suppressed, although an interpretation 
of  the  retouch  theory  considered  by  Breitmeyer  and 
Öğmen (2000, 2006) would predict some diminished, 
2
pyramidal neuron in the 
sensory cortex 
specific pathway for sensory 
information transmission 
non-specific thalamocortical 
pathway for modulation of 
the activity of neurons that 
carry specific information 
channels for lateral 
cortical interactions 
Figure 2. 
A schematic of a cortical slice where interaction between O-binding (left-side loop) and C-binding (right-side loop) systems takes 
place at the single-unit level. (The central part of this picture is adapted from Llinas, R.R., Urbano, F.J., Leznik, E., Ramirez, R.R., 
& van Marle, H.J.F. (2005). Rhythmic and dysrhythmic thalamocortical dynamics: GABA systems and the edge effect. TINS, 28(6), 
325-333.) The specific pathway activates pyramidal neurons and inhibitory interneurons (upper red), producing cortical oscillations by 
direct activation and feedforward inhibition. Collaterals from this pathway produce thalamic feedback inhibition through the reticular 
nucleus (lower red). The return corticothalamic pathway (curved green arrow) from pyramidal cells returns this oscillatory loop to 
specific and reticular thalamic nuclei (yellow and red lower circles). The non-specific thalamocortical pathway projects to the cortex 
and gives collaterals to the reticular nucleus. Pyramidal neurons return the oscillation to the non-specific and reticular thalamic nuclei 
(green and red lower circles). This forms the second resonant loop (curved green arrow on the right). The conjunction of the specific 
and non-specific loops is hypothesised to generate functional binding by temporal coincidence.Synchronised oscillations and retouch
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but  yet  existing  residual  SP-activity,  and  thus  some 
diminished visibility when the delayed NSP-modulation 
arrives? We should not forget that in addition to the 
process  of  C-binding,  visibility  is  determined  also  by 
interactions  within  the  O-binding  system.  With  some 
stimulus configurations, especially when the same or 
very close features could be in principle bound either 
with the target object or with the mask-object (e.g., 
perimeter edge of the disc and inner edge of the mask-
ing annulus), the conflict is out-ruled by an oscillatory 
process  where  the  critical  feature  is  bound  to  mask 
features instead of the target features and, in addition, 
local lateral-inhibitory interactions are quite strong. The   
C-binding process finds a “partner oscillation” in the way 
of mask features’ representing activity, while the target 
features’ representing activity is nullified (likely out-of-
phase  and/or  decayed).  This  explanation  is  not  very 
good for some substitution-masking effects though.
A standard paradigm for substition masking presents 
a target (e.g., Landolt ring with a gap) together with 
the distractor stimuli (e.g., other Landolt stimuli at dif-
ferent  spatial  positions).  The  target  is  marked  by  a 
mask that consists of four dots surrounding the target. 
Target and mask are presented together, but when the 
target and distractors are switched off, the mask is the 
only stimulus that stays on for a variable time (a com-
mon onset, asynchronous offset method). If the target 
were presented alone and masked with this type of 
mask, there would be no masking and the target would 
be well visible. This is why this is sometimes called a 
weak mask. But if there is positional uncertainty of the 
target due to distractors and a larger load on atten-
tion, the same mask is effective in producing severe 
masking (especially with longer offset delays).
Perhaps the reason why there is no metacontrast 
with the so-called weak masks in substitution mask-
ing (in the trials with no distractors) has to do with 
the  lack  of  conflict  between  target  and  mask  fea-
tures. They are not competitors within the O-binding 
processing  activity,  but  are  moderate  competitors 
for the C-binding resources. This competition shows 
up only when distractors are present and C-binding 
oscillations therefore take longer to arrive at respec-
tive cortical sites. On the other hand, even when the 
presence of distractors help to lead to effective sub-
stitution masking of the otherwise well-visible target, 
masking is diminished or eliminated when spatial at-
tention  is  directed  to  the  target  location  before  its 
presentation (Enns, 2004). In terms of the revised 
retouch theory, the pre-cue evokes C-binding proc-
esses ahead in time and when the target appears, 
SP-oscillations  are  quickly  integrated  into  the  syn-
chronised NSP+SP, oscillatory ensemble. The target 
becomes visible at once.
According to the results of our recent study (Luiga 
&  Bachmann,  in  press),  release  from  substitution 
masking is obtainable with local spatial pre-cues, but 
not with central pre-cues that direct spatial attention 
in an abstract, encoded format (and this holds even 
for very long SOAs between pre-cue and target-plus-
mask stimulus, where there is plenty of time for the 
pre-cue to be processed and interpreted). My explana-
tion is that it is difficult to engage a sufficiently ef-
fective localised (receptive-field-centered) process of 
NSP-oscillations with central pre-cues; the C-binding 
oscillatory wave has to propagate far in cortical tissue 
and, consequently, (1) it takes time, (2) phase coher-
ence suffers, (3) oscillatory amplitude decreases. As a 
result, central pre-cue is not effective and the target 
is not retouched for consciousness in a salient enough 
capacity.  What  matters  is  not  attention  (as  such), 
but the conditions that enable evocation of a burst of 
coarsely  localised  oscillatory  and  facilitating  activity 
instead.
As stated before, gamma oscillations are sensitive 
to input novelty and onsets. The most distinct burst of 
gamma activity emerges about 50-150 ms after stim-
ulation onset. This means that when a stream of input 
stimuli is presented with no long empty intervals be-
tween the stream items inserted, the stimuli appearing 
in the epoch of the stream that covers 50-150 ms after 
stream onset have to benefit from the relatively more 
facilitated binding process. We can have subjects per-
form an identification task where two successive and 
spatially overlapping targets (S1 and S2) are present-
ed with varying SOAs and within a stream of otherwise 
invariant stimuli (e.g., letter I flashed repetitively as a 
stream at the same position in a RSVP manner, with 
stream item frequency of about 20-60 Hz). And we can 
vary the stream epoch within which the targets that 
are to be identified are inserted in between the stream 
items. Indeed, when successive targets are presented 
within invariant-item streams, S1 dominates  S2 in ex-
plicit perception exactly within the first stream epoch, 
but this pattern of relative visibility of the two targets 
returns to the typical S2 > S1 at later stream epochs 
(Bachmann & Sikka, 2005). Appearance of a stream 
seems to cause a burst of gamma activity, maximised 
(in terms of amplitude and/or coherence) at 50-150 ms 
post-onset, and everything that comes in at that time 
is facilitated. (Indirect support for this conjecture came 
also from a study by Bachmann and Oja, who found 
that the flash-lag effect, measured in terms of how 
much an in-stream target becomes visible faster than 48
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an isolated target, was maximised up to about 80 ms 
within 50-150 ms after stream onset, but reduced to 
about 30 ms at later stream epochs – see Bachmann, 
2006.)
An intriguing set of experimental findings has been 
introduced  by  Michael  Herzog’s  team  (e.g.,  Herzog, 
2006). They often use small vernier stimuli as targets 
that have to be discriminated – whether a minute spa-
tial displacement of an upper vertical bar away from 
collinearity with a lower vertical bar is in the left or 
right direction. Masks are various bar- and grating like 
stimuli that quite closely flank the targets in space, 
but  do  not  overlap  with  them.  Therefore,  the  para-
digm is close to metacontrast masking. Thus, a vernier 
target can be strongly masked by a flanking localised 
grating,  but  becomes  visible  when  the  same  local 
grating is extended much more to the periphery (the 
shine-though effect). The old version of the retouch 
theory cannot easily account for this effect: S2 has 
to be preferred anyway. Now I see there a possibility 
to understand this discrepancy. Within the O-binding 
system, the more extended mask object, for whatever 
reason (lateral-inhibitory interactions between grating 
elements or belonging to a different set of visual ge-
stalts than the local mini-grating), allows parallel and 
mutually  non-exclusive  oscillatory  binding  processes 
for S1 and S2. The later-arriving oscillatory C-process 
absorbs both SP-oscillatory sets. My intuition is that if 
we would experimentally measure the exact oscillatory 
response to the narrowly localised grating-mask and 
to the spatially extended grating-mask, and compare 
these responses with the oscillatory response to the 
vernier target, then we may find either one of the two 
possibilities.  First,  a  better  potential  for  coherence 
or  multiplicative  frequency-relation  between  target-
evoked  oscillations  and  mask-evoked  oscillations  in 
the case of shine-through could be found. This may 
be a brain-process equivalent of generating good ge-
stalts with all parts being involved and not mutually 
inhibited. Secondly, it may appear that in the case of 
shine-through conditions, the arrival of the oscillatory 
burst to the mask is faster or slower relative to the 
arrival of the oscillatory burst to the target. By virtue 
of this, target and mask dynamic representations are 
separated in time and masking interactions are pre-
vented. These hypotheses remain to be tested.
Feature  inheritance  effects  (e.g.,  Herzog,  2006; 
Otto et al., 2006) are another instance of new findings 
from more modern masking research. Sometimes, al-
though remaining invisible itself, the masked vernier 
target  induces  an  illusory  perceptual  appearance  of 
the clearly visible mask features: an actually collinear 
vernier-like stimulus within the masking grating ap-
pears as if depicting a shift of the vernier elements, 
which  inherit  the  shift  characteristic  of  the  masked 
vernier. This effect could be understood as misbinding 
within the O-binding oscillatory system (tilted or offset 
feature carrying neurons remaining in the pool of the 
synchronised set that is dominated by the mask spe-
cific signals, thus biasing what else is involved in that 
compound). This misbinding becomes explicated as an 
illusion by the C-binding system. The nice feature of 
this conceptualisation is that we need not worry about 
the non-conscious status of the masked target. The 
O-binding system can work pre-consciously for a big 
part of the specific signals and even in parallel with the 
O-binding set that is being integrated with C-binding 
activities. For instance, the tilt feature is involved in 
the C-bound set, but the location feature of the target 
is not.
The  temporal  dissociation  of  different  aspects  of 
masking, such as between contour- and brightness-
processing  mechanisms  (Breitmeyer  et  al.,  2006; 
Ishikawa et al., 2006), as well as absence of meta-
contrast with opposite-polarity luminous targets and 
masks (Becker & Anstis, 2004), are a valuable recent 
addition  to the masking literature. In Breitmeyer et 
al. (2006), meta- and paracontrast was studied, and 
subjects had to judge the surface brightness of target 
discs or else discriminate the contours of target discs 
(with a small edge segment cut off at different loca-
tions). Targets were masked by surrounding rings as 
in the many earlier classic studies. It appeared that 
optimum SOAs for the contour task were much shorter 
than those for the brightness task. In paracontrast, 
where the mask precedes the target in time, target 
contrast facilitation was found (consistent with even 
the earlier version of the retouch theory). Ishikawa et 
al. (2006) varied grating-orientation and –spatial fre-
quency of the surface of targets and masks, and they 
also applied a metacontrast task requiring detection of 
targets.  They found that at short SOAs, metacontrast 
magnitude  strongly  depended  on  stimulus  feature 
specificity,  whereas  at  longer  SOAs  (above  40  ms), 
masking demonstrated strong contrast sensitivity and 
low stimulus feature specificity. In the earlier retouch 
theory version (Bachmann, 1994) it was claimed that 
metacontrast is unspecific to spatial-frequency proper-
ties of the stimuli. Now this remains to be revised.
The above described effects are both accountable 
by assuming variations in the oscillatory activity within 
the O-binding system. This variation can be a function 
of temporal properties of the brightness, surface and 
contour encoding sensory systems. In some instances, Synchronised oscillations and retouch
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parallel oscillatory activity between target-related and 
mask-related object binding may be possible when the 
channels (e.g., on-system and off-system) can involve 
oscillatory activity in parallel, with the result emerging 
that C-binding explicates both the target and mask. In 
some other instances, as is the case with inter-contour 
conflict, C-binding explicates severe metacontrast with 
one range of timing; in the case of brightness-process-
ing mechanisms being involved, the timing character-
istics may differ.
The earlier version of the retouch theory predicted 
U-shaped metacontrast functions without any further 
oscillatory shape of the masking function as depend-
ent on SOA (Bachmann, 1994). If we revise the under-
standing of interaction between the O-binding and C-
binding systems so that oscillatory processes become 
important, we should expect that masking functions 
could also show some oscillatory appearance. Because 
the SOAs in masking studies have mostly been varied 
with too large steps, it is not clear whether oscilla-
tions  in  masking  functions  are  a  firm  reality.  Some 
first steps in showing that oscillatory masking in the 
gamma-range periodicity appearing in the non-mono-
tonic masking functions can be found have been taken 
by Purushothaman, Öğmen and Bedell (2000).
Besides  masking,  retouch  theory  was  used  to 
explain  several  other  phenomena  such  as  flash-lag 
effect, Fröhlich  effect, PLP  and  some others as  well 
(Bachmann,  1999,  2006).  In  the  experiments  dem-
onstrating  the  flash-lag  effect,  two  types  of  stimu-
lation  are  juxtaposed:  an  object  that  continuously 
changes its feature value is presented for some time, 
and another object that carries an invariant feature 
value is briefly flashed alongside the changing object 
(e.g., the spatial location of a moving bar is changing 
or the colour of a stationary disc gradually changes 
from  yellow  to  red  while    another  bar  is  flashed  at 
a stationary location as aligned with the moving bar 
or another disc is flashed nearby and has the same 
colour as the changing disc precisely at the moment of 
flash presentation). Flash-lag effect means an illusion 
where the feature value of the flashed object (e.g., lo-
cation, colour) lags behind the perceived feature value 
of the changing object. In the Fröhlich efect (Fröhlich, 
1923), the perceived first position of a moving object 
that comes from behind an occluder is located not at 
the position it actually became exposed (at the edge of 
the occluder), but at a position shifted forwards from 
the edge. In PLP, the subjective moment in time when 
the target object becomes visible is speeded up (visual 
latency decreased), provided that a priming stimulus 
– no matter whether it is masked to invisibility by the 
target or remains visible – is presented ahead in time 
(for about 30-100 ms).
Perceptual retouch theory has a common explana-
tion for all these listed phenomena. The delayed NSP-
modulation  arrives  when  the  SP-contents  that  are 
encoded cortically are already changed, and conscious 
representation includes the new feature values; it per-
forms this build-up of conscious representation faster 
than it does in the case of a single stimulus presenta-
tion because the NSP-process was set in motion by the 
preceding stimulation. However, with PLP there seem 
to exist some controversies between data on the one 
hand and retouch theory predictions on the other hand 
(e.g., Scharlau, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 2005). First, 
as most of the robust PLP effects have been obtained 
by the metacontrast-like stimulation conditions (mask 
perception being facilitated by the preceding target), 
and since metacontrast interaction is a spatially very 
precise  one  (assuming  small  receptive  fields  of  the 
critical feature representing units), the retouch expla-
nation can be put in doubt. This is because in the origi-
nal version of the theory the NSP/modulatory neurons 
are assumed to have large receptive fields, but PLP 
effects can be spatially very precise. This problem can 
be overcome if we understand that C-binding results 
depend also on the accompanying O-binding results: 
what is explicated for consciousness and how (fast) it 
is explicated depends also on the nature of interac-
tions within the SP-system. Although C-binding neu-
rons have large receptive fields and their oscillation 
is widespread, because O-binding neurons have small 
receptive fields and oscillations are more localised, the 
facilitating effect can be quite precise in space.
The  same  argument  applies  to  the  criticism  sug-
gesting that perceptual retouch as an automatic proc-
ess is not open to top-down influences. For example, 
Scharlau et al. (2005) found that the values of the PLP 
depend on the judgment method for temporal order 
of a prime and a target. Changes come in depending 
on whether subjects attend to the prime or the target. 
But the controversy may not be fully founded because 
even if part of the C-binding oscillations is mostly fed-
in in a feedforward manner (especially its initial burst), 
the  O-binding  processes  include  reentrant  signalling 
and attentional pretuning can have its (localised and 
bias-related) effect. But the results of this effect have 
to  be  retouched  for  consciousness  by  the  C-binding 
nevertheless, and the timing of visibility will ultimately 
depend on the latency of NSP-oscillatory application.
The intriguing feature of the PLP effect is that there 
is  no  direct  correspondence  between  the  prime-to-
mask SOA and the temporal value of latency shorten-50
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ing due to priming (with the coefficient equal to about 
0.5). If we have SOA between prime and target as 
the argument and the psychophysically estimated PLP 
value as the ordinate (see Figure 3), the old version of 
the retouch theory was supposed to predict PLP = SOA.   
Actually, as seen in Figure 3, PLP values tend to devi-
ate from the theoretically expected y = x, function. 
(Instead, y = kx seems to happen, with k equal to 
about 0.5.) The revised retouch theory can be speci-
fied so as to be able to explain this puzzle. We can 
assume that it is not the latency with which the first 
discharges in the cortex, caused by subcortical presy-
naptic NSP-facilitation, emerge that causes retouch up 
to consciousness. Instead, a certain critical duration of 
the combined oscillatory activity that is necessary for 
explicit representation is what matters (compare also 
Benjamin Libet’s and Christof Koch’s notion about a 
minimum duration of activity necessary for conscious-
ness – Koch, 2004). If so, there are many possibilities 
to explain the 0.5 ratio between PLP values and SOA 
values. Term it “C-recruitment, temporal coefficient”, 
if you wish.
The  standing  wave  of  invisibility,  metacontrast 
masking (e.g., Macknick & Martinez-Conde, 2004), is 
another new development in masking literature that 
needs  a  commentary  based  on  the  retouch  theory 
assumptions.  Usually  masking  is  demonstrated  by 
flashing two brief successive stimuli – the target and 
the mask, or vice versa. Both stimulation and the ef-
fects it brings about are so fast and short lived that it 
may not be very easy to make precise measurements 
of the effects. It is especially frustrating, considering 
that many modern methods of brain imaging such as 
fMRI or PET recquire longer state variables in order 
to produce good and reliable results. In the standing 
wave of invisibility illusion, target and mask, for in-
stance a solid disc and a ring that snugly embraces 
the target, are alternatingly and continuously flashed 
for an extended time. With optimal temporal and lumi-
nance related parameters, it is possible to render the 
target effectively invisible for extended time periods 
spanning up to many seconds. From the revised re-
touch theory point of view, the effect is interpreted as 
both inhibitory interactions within SP where O-binding 
chooses the annulus instead of the disc (or flankers 
instead of the flanked target), and predominance of 
mask-related  SP-oscillations  in  specific  data  binding 
with NSP-oscillations for the consciously experienced 
representation.  Robust  dichoptic  effects  of  masking 
and weak interocular suppression between binocular 
neurons at the early levels of the visual cortex (op. 
cit.)  suggest  that  widespread  NSP-oscillations  for   
C-binding that are interacting with SP-oscillations for 
O-binding are especially important when taking place 
in advanced visual (e.g., lateral occipital) and temporal 
cortical locations.
WELL-KNOWN MASKING THEORIES 
AND “BINDING BINDING”
As a dual-process theory, the revised retouch theory 
should  not  be  understood  as  an  approach  that  is 
exclusive  with  regard  to  other  theories.  First  of  all, 
the inhibitory and misbinding interactions within the   
O-binding system, which form the contents of percep-
tual representation that are completed for the moment 
of C-binding application, can be explained and have 
to be explained by the more specialised sensory-as-
pect, masking theories. Thereby, an important task is 
to differentiate in what circumstances masking effects 
directly originate from the SP/NSP interaction and the 
corresponding  two-system  actions’  relative  timing 
dynamics, and in what circumstances retouch simply 
explicates  the  results  of  masking-interactions  that 
take place within the SP-system. Related to this, we 
have to understand and show what the experimental 
conditions  and  stimulation  properties  are  where  the 
retouch theory provides a direct mechanistic explana-
tion for the masking effects at hand, and where the 
very  mechanism(s)  of  masking  are  independent  of 
NSP-action (the latter simply explicates the results of 
masking-interaction for visual awareness).
1.  The  RECOD  model  of  masking  (Breitmeyer  & 
Öğmen, 2006), which outsprung from the earlier very 
influential  transient-on-sustained  and  sustained-on-
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Figure 3. 
An illustration of the functional relationship relating SOA (set 
between prime and target) with perceptual asynchrony be-
tween targets presented in control conditions without prime 
and main experimental conditions where prime precedes tar-
get. The slope of the function is about 0.5. (Adapted from 
Aschersleben and Bachmann, 2004, unpublished.)Synchronised oscillations and retouch
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sustained theory, relates to the retouch acount in the 
following way. The feature binding and sensory (lat-
eral) inhibition aspects are dealt with within the set of 
processes of O-binding, with a special emphasis on the 
contour processing mechanisms. The same applies to 
unconscious priming effects. Saliency of surfaces (in 
the context of masking) and appearance of integrated, 
holistic objects in awareness requires involvement of 
C-binding processes. An interesting possibility should 
be to see whether, and if yes then how, the transient 
system action participates in the evocation of the cru-
cial first burst of gamma-oscillations – both within SP 
and within NSP. The fine-tuning of the understanding of 
contour versus surface and contrast mechanisms’ roles 
in the light of C-binding mechanism’s action is also one 
of the prime tasks.
2. When introducing substitution masking theory, Di 
Lollo, Enns and their associates (e.g., Di Lollo et al., 
2000; Enns, 2004) advanced some earlier accounts of 
attention-dependent masking effects (e.g., Bachmann 
& Allik, 1976; Di Lollo et al., 1974; Eriksen & Collins, 
1969; Michaels & Turvey, 1979; Ramachandran & Cobb, 
1995; Tremblay-Shelley & Mack, 1999) and provided 
a  strong  paradigmatic  case  for  attention-dependent 
masking. From the retouch theory point of view, sub-
stitution-masking can be seen primarily as the result 
of delayed involvement of NSP-based C-binding oscilla-
tions after the SP-based O-binding operations (includ-
ing reentrant signalling and partial decay of S1 at the 
pattern level in favour of S2 representation) have been 
already carried out. When, due to distractors, atten-
tion is dispersed, NSP-resources cannot be rigorously 
and  rapidly  invoked  and  mask  information  becomes 
the dominating data for retouch because C-binding be-
comes effective only at the moment when the O-bind-
ing  process  emphasises  mask-object  representation. 
When C-binding has been set on in advance, substitu-
tion masking obviously disappears, but the pre-cue has 
to be sensory in nature and spatially localised close to 
the target (Luiga & Bachmann, in press).
ENDCOMMENTS
To  end  the  acquaintance-tour  of  this  sketch  of  the 
modified  perceptual  retouch  theory,  a  few  general 
remarks are necessary.  Due to its emphasis on the 
temporally  extended  process  of  SP/NSP  interaction, 
retouch  theory  naturally  fits  with  the  notions  about 
minimum excitatory duration, which is necessary for 
a conscious percept to emerge (e.g., Libet’s or Koch’s 
works – see Koch, 2004), and about the importance 
of considering the object updating operations in addi-
tion to dealing with simple delays of first manifesta-
tions of neural (cognitive) responses after stimuli onset 
[e.g., Enns, Lleras, & Di Lollo’s (2006), Kahneman & 
Treisman’s (1984), Kanwisher’s (2001), Koch’s (2004), 
Neumann’s, Müsseler’s and Scharlau’s (see Scharlau, 
2004) works]. The rigid onset-onset scrutiny may not 
be  enough  for  understanding  masking  and  related 
phenomena. Masking as the process of preventing the 
target from becoming consciously experienced should 
be analysed by temporally extended cyclic processes 
insofar as the very phenomena of visual awareness are 
based on temporally extended oscillatory processes.
  The amended retouch theory appears to help build 
bridges between various research paradigms such as 
masking, flash-lag, PLP, Fröhlich effect, masked prim-
ing, pre-conscious processing, visual spatial attentional 
pre-cueing,  and  line-motion  illusion,  but  maybe  also 
crowding  effects,  motion-induced  blindness,  binocu-
lar rivalry, change blindness, repetition blindness and 
attentional blink. But this agenda remains out of the 
scope of the present article. In the domain of masking, 
the core predictor of masking strength should be the 
empirically tested establishment of SP/NSP oscillatory 
synchrony – its emergence, dynamics and maintenance 
in time.
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